Sponsoring Powers of the San Francisco Conference (April-June 1945) that established the United Nations, the USSR also became a permanent member of the UN Security Council. 3 Of the fifteen Republics, Russia was by far the largest and most populous. 4 Following the failed coup d'état in Moscow in August 1991, the independence of the three Baltic republics of the Soviet Union (Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia) was recognized by a large number of States, including most of the western European countries and the United States. Bowing to the inevitable, on 6 September 1991, the State Council of the Soviet Union released these three republics from its ranks and recognized their independence. 5 On 17 September 1991, they were admitted to the United Nations. 6 The remaining twelve republics, having in turn all proclaimed their independence by December 1991, then proceeded, first at the tripartite meeting of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus (the new name of the former Byelorussia) held at Minsk on 8 December 1991, and subsequently at the meeting of eleven republics, 7 held in Alma-Ata (the capital of Kazakhstan) on 21 December 1991, to declare that the Soviet Union had ceased to exist as a subject of international law and that they would henceforth constitute the Commonwealth of Independent States. In the preamble to the two declarations adopted in Minsk by the leaders of Belarus, Russia and Ukraine, the three signatories stated that 'the USSR, as a subject of international law and a geopolitical reality, is ceasing its existence'. 8 Likewise, the eleven participating republics at the Alma-Ata conference stated in the fifth operative paragraph of the first of five declarations adopted by them that 'with the formation of the Commonwealth of Independent States, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics ceases to exist'. 9 Furthermore, in Article 1 of the fifth declaration, entitled 'On UN Membership', the eleven signatories agreed that international law and was a member of the United Nations, there was no legal justification for the UN membership of any of its constituent republics, just as none of the states of the United States ever sought or acquired UN membership. If, on the other hand, the Ukraine and Byelorussia were considered independent nations for the purpose of UN membership, then all the other constituent republics of the USSR -but not the Soviet Union itself -should have been considered as subjects of international law and as such should have been admitted to the UN. However, political rather than legal considerations carried the day: US President Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Churchill, in an effort to allay the suspicions of Soviet Premier Stalin that the future international organization would be totally dominated by the western powers, consented at the Yalta summit conference of The Russian republic's territory (17,075 million square kilometres) constituted 76% of the total territory of 22.4 million square kilometres of the Soviet Union and its population (148 million) constituted 51% of the total population of 288.7 million of the Soviet Union. If one takes into account that five of the fifteen republics of the former Soviet Union (Ukraine, Belarus and the three Baltic republics) with a combined population of 70.1 million and a territory of 986,000 square kilometres were already members of the UN at the time of the Soviet Union's dissolution, Russia's share in the population of 218.6 million of the remaining ten republics rises to almost 68% and its share in the territory of those republics to almost 80%. 5
The New York Times, 7 September 1991, A4, col. the membership of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in the United Nations, including the Security Council and all other organs and organizations of the United Nations system, is being continued by the Russian Federation (RSFSR) with the support of the countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States. In this connection, I request that the name 'Russian Federation' should be used in the United Nations in place of the name 'the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics'. The Russian Federation maintains full responsibility for all the rights and obligations of the USSR under the Charter of the United Nations, including the financial obligations. I request that you consider this letter as confirmation of the credentials to represent the Russian Federation in United Nations organs for all the persons currently holding the credentials of representatives of the USSR to the United Nations. 12 The Secretary-General thereupon circulated Mr. Yeltsin's request with Ambassador Vorontsov's cover letter among the UN membership, adding that he had 'informed the President of the General Assembly and of the Security Council of these letters, as they relate to matters of interest to all organs and organizations of the United Nations system...' 13 In the absence of any objection, the delegation of the Russian Federation took over the Soviet seat in the UN General Assembly, in the Security Council and in other organs of the United Nations, with the appropriate changes of the name-plates and flag having been undertaken by the UN Secretariat. No new credentials were presented by Ambassador Vorontsov in his new capacity as the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation. On 31 January 1992 Russian President Yeltsin himself was in the Russian Federation's seat in the Security Council during the 'summit meeting' of the Council attended by heads of state and government. 14 In addition to Russia, two other members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (Ukraine and Belarus) had already been, as mentioned above, members of the United Nations. 15 The remaining eight members of the Commonwealth of Independent States were admitted to the United Nations on 2 March 1992. 16 Georgia was admitted to the UN on 31 July 1992, under General Assembly resolution A/46/241.
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The New York Times, 23 December 1991, A10, col. Burma to Myanmar in 1989) , only certain administrative measures, to reflect the requirements of the English alphabet, were deemed necessary (such as changing the name-plate and flag of the State in question and moving its seat in the General Assembly and in any other organ of which it may have been a member).
Consequently, the change of name per se from 'Soviet Union' to 'Russian Federation' does not affect the question of the UN membership of Russia if it can be established that there is continuity and identity, for the purposes of international law, between the former Soviet Union and the Russian Federation.
III. Is The Russian Federation the Continuation of the Soviet Union?
In the history of the United Nations there have been a number of instances in which member States of the Organization lost a portion of their territorial domain as a result of the secession of a part of their population. The general practice of the United Nations in these instances has been to regard the 'parent' State's membership in the Organization as unaffected by the loss of a part of its territory, while requiring the secessionist province or provinces to apply for UN membership.
The question first arose in 1947 as a result of the partitioning of India on its accession to independence into two States -India and Pakistan. 18 That development led to a memorandum by the United Nations Secretariat which stated in part that:
From the viewpoint of international law, the situation is one in which a part of an existing State breaks off and becomes a new State. On this analysis, there is no change in the international status of India; it continues as a State with all the treaty rights and obligations, and consequently, with all the rights and obligations of membership in the United Nations. At first glance it would appear that Russia's assumption of the UN seat of the former Soviet Union fully conforms to past practice. India, the United Arab Republic and Pakistan, for example, were all considered identical to the original 'parent' State and thus entitled to continue their UN membership unaffected by the loss of a part of their territory and population. The applicable legal construction rests on the assumption that the international legal personality of the State in question is preserved, notwithstanding its loss of territory and population. By contrast, if the new State is perceived as lacking such identity and continuity with its predecessor and as representing a new international personality, the applicable rules will be those of the law of succession. As far as membership of international organizations (including the United Nations) is concerned, the practical meaning of all this is that the new State so perceived will have to be admitted to membership in the United Nations in accordance with the requirements of Article 4 of the Charter, 25 as were Pakistan in 1947 and Bangladesh in 1974.
However, a closer examination of the events that took place in December 1991, leading to the dissolution of the Soviet Union, would appear to reveal important differences between the Pakistan and Bangladesh situations, on the one hand, and the Soviet-Russian situation of 1991, on the other. In the latter case all the constituent republics of the former Soviet Union adamantly and unambiguously asserted that the international legal personality of the Soviet Union had been extinguished; indeed, their very assertion of their independence rested on the claim, first articulated in the Minsk declaration of 8 December 1991, 26 and subsequently repeated in the first Alma-Ata declaration of 21 December 1991, 27 that the Soviet Union, as a subject of international law, had ceased to exist.
One might take the view that the three participants of the Minsk conference had no right to dissolve the Soviet Union (but at most a right of secession for themselves) and that, consequently, at least the nine Soviet republics that did not participate in that conference still constituted the 'Soviet Union'. 28 Yet the simple fact remains that on 21 December 1991, eleven of those republics declared in Alma-Ata (with the twelfth republic -Georgiaattending as an observer) that 'with the formation of the Commonwealth of Independent States subjects of international law. 23
On the question of Syria's renewed seating in the United Nations, without resort to the admission procedure laid down in Article 4 of the Charter (on the theory that Syria, as an original member of the UN, did not require re-admission and was merely 'resuming' her former status within the Organization), see M.M. Whiteman, Law and International Law (1967) 197. 25 Ibid., 187. 26 See supra note 8. 27
See supra note 9. 28
In the present view, Russia -as one of the three signatories of the Minsk declaration -would in any event have been precluded ('estopped') from asserting the continuing existence of the Soviet Union after 8 December 1991. However, for present purposes it is not deemed necessary to examine this question in greater depth.
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics ceases to exist' 29 . In other words, the precondition for the emergence, on the international plane, of the various independent States, loosely associated within the framework of the new Commonwealth, was the disappearance of the former Soviet Union as an international legal personality and its extinction as a subject of international law.
The logical legal conclusion that should have been drawn from these facts thus seems to be clear: with the demise of the Soviet Union itself, its membership in the UN should have automatically lapsed and Russia should have been admitted to membership in the same way as the other newly-independent republics (except for Belarus and Ukraine). As already stated by the UN General Assembly's Sixth Committee in 1947, the rights and obligations of membership of a State cease to exist 'with its extinction as a legal person internationally recognized as such '. 30 Apparently, at some point between 21 and 24 December 1991, there developed a recognition of this problem and of the resulting implications for Soviet membership in the UN in general, and in the Security Council in particular. It would seem that this belated realization also prompted the dispatch on 24 December 1991 (some 24 hours before Soviet President Gorbachev's resignation 31 ) of Soviet Ambassador Vorontsov's letter asserting, on behalf of Russian President Yeltsin, that Russia was 'continuing' the Soviet membership in the UN. 32 This claim of the Russian Federation -made some three days (and possibly sixteen days) after the dissolution of the Soviet Union -that it was 'continuing' the legal existence and hence the UN membership of the latter, must thus be considered -irrespective of its obvious political merits -as being seriously flawed from the legal point of view.
IV. Is Russia Entitled to the Soviet Permanent Seat in the UN Security Council?
The conclusion arrived at in the previous section -if adhered to -might have also brought about the elimination of Soviet (and subsequently Russian) permanent membership in the UN Security Council. Such an outcome would have clearly precipitated a serious constitutional crisis for the United Nations: the resulting situation would have violated the explicit provisions of Article 23(1) of the UN Charter, as amended, under which the Council should consist of five permanent and ten non-permanent members. 33 It is reasonable to assume that considerations of this nature played a major role in prompting the Secretary-General and the UN membership to accede to Russia's claim -however flawed legally -to be the 'continuation' of the Soviet Union.
Once this claim was accepted, it followed logically that the Soviet permanent seat in the Security Council also belonged to Russia. It is of course true that Article 23(1) designates the five permanent members of the Council (including 'the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics') by name. But here, again, it would be absurd to assume that a mere change in the name of a permanent member could bring about the termination of its seat in the Council. This provision of Article 23(1) must thus be read as referring to the names of the permanent members at the 29 See supra note 9; emphasis added. 30
See supra note 21; emphasis added. 31
See supra note 11. 32
See supra note 12. 33
The disappearance of a permanent member of the Security Council would have had constitutional implications also beyond the activities of the Security Council itself: under Article 86(1) of the Charter a permanent member of the Security Council is also automatically seated on the Trusteeship Council. Under Article 108 the ratification by all five permanent members of the Security Council is one of the conditions required for a Charter amendment to take effect.
V. Conclusion
In a newspaper article written by Prof. Richard N. Gardner of Columbia Law School and Toby Trister Gati, senior vice-president of the US UN Association, entitled 'Russia Deserves the Soviet Seat' 34 it was correctly pointed out that '[i]t makes sense for Russia to assume the Soviet Union's rights and obligations at the UN, since Russia exercises authority over 150 million people and controls some 75 percent of the land mass and valuable resources of the Soviet Union'. The authors were also correct that giving Russia the Soviet seat at the UN does also 'avoid a constitutional crisis that could paralyse the UN if the [Security] Council seat were left vacant or if other members pressed for other changes in the Council'. 35 Their article was published on 19 December 1991, two days before the Alma-Ata conference, at a time when the Soviet Union arguably still existed as a legal entity. While the authors' political reasoning is still eminently valid, the developments that took place between 21 and 24 December 1991, within days after the article's publication, would appear to have somewhat detracted from the legal cogency of their argumentation. Nonetheless, there can be little doubt that for reasons of pragmatic politics and equity alike Russia was the natural candidate for the Soviet seat in the United Nations (including the permanent seat in the Security Council). The correct legal path to this end would have been for all the republics of the Soviet Union except Russia to secede from the union, thus preserving the continuity between the Soviet Union and Russia for UN membership purposes. For reasons of Soviet domestic politics such a solution was apparently not feasible. Thus resulted a practical solution which, while politically the only realistic one, remains legally suspect.
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